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WRITING OFF RACE
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN*
I
 INTRODUCTION
The constitutionality of affirmative action has now become one of the
central topics in the politics of race.  Ironically, the United States Constitution
says absolutely nothing about affirmative action.  The text never mentions the
term, and the equal protection language in the Fourteenth Amendment simply
begs the question of whether equality requires or precludes the use of
affirmative action.1  The intent of the Framers is similarly unhelpful.  We know
that the drafters of the Fifth Amendment owned slaves,2 and the drafters of the
Fourteenth Amendment envisioned a racially stratified society.3 But the
Fourteenth Amendment was itself an affirmative action measure,4 and few of us
think that the racial prejudices of the Framers should continue to govern
contemporary race relations.  There are a host of fancier, non-interpretivist
constitutional theories, including structural theories, moral theories, civic-
republican theories, representation-reinforcement theories, public-choice
theories, and postmodern critical-race theories,5 but none has sufficiently broad
support to claim status as the one “authentic” approach to constitutional inter-
pretation.  Rather, they are parochial overlays imposed on a Constitution that is
best understood as defining the terms of engagement for political bargaining.
Given the increasingly transparent dominance of political policy considerations
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1. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.”).
2. See DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1765-
1820, at 209, 210, 244-46 (1971), quoted in GEOFFREY R. STONE  ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 496-
97 (3d ed. 1996).
3. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-46 (1896) (noting that the object of 14th Amendment
was not to abolish distinctions based on color, or to enforce social equality); see also ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 346-411 (1988) (discussing
racial stratification during Reconstruction).
4. Although written in race-neutral terms, the intent of the 14th Amendment was to provide
missing legal protections for former black slaves and to authorize Congress to enact protective
legislation for blacks.  See STONE ET AL., supra note 2, at 505-08.  The Reconstruction legislation
enacted contemporaneously with the Reconstruction amendments, which included various Freedmen’s
Bills, provided special assistance to blacks.  See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative
History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 755-83 (1985).
5. Many of these theories are described in MICHAEL J. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES (2d ed. 2000).  See also JOHN H. GARVEY & T.
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER (4th ed. 1999);
MICHAEL J. GLENNON ET AL., A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY (2d ed. 1997).
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in Supreme Court constitutional adjudication, it is not surprising that recent
strands of constitutional scholarship have chosen to advocate judicial
minimalism,6 and even the curtailment of judicial review.7
Because the Constitution says absolutely nothing about affirmative action,
the Supreme Court should have absolutely nothing to say about it either.
Rather, the political branches should set the nation’s affirmative action policy,
and they should do so with political leadership provided by the President.
President Clinton has both advocated and actively practiced affirmative action
to the extent that he could do so without offending the racial policy preferences
of the Supreme Court.  But he has failed to perform a presidential function that
has even greater constitutional significance.  He has failed to contest the
Supreme Court’s usurpation of racial policymaking power from the political
branches of government.
II
  CLINTON’S SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Proponents of affirmative action believe that the nature of racial
discrimination in the United States is such that only the race-conscious
reallocation of resources can promote racial equality.  They think that race-
neutral, colorblind approaches to civil rights will simply perpetuate the existing
inequalities that have been imposed on racial minorities throughout the history
of the nation.  However, opponents of affirmative action believe that colorblind
remedies for past discrimination can eventually provide equal opportunities for
oppressed minorities.  They think that race-conscious remedies will simply
replicate in reverse the racial discrimination of the past.  Although the political
debate about affirmative action seems largely intractable, President Clinton has
chosen to side with the proponents of affirmative action.  After a formal review
of the nation’s affirmative action programs, the President formally adopted a
“mend it/don’t end it” policy, in the belief that a continued commitment to
6. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996) (favoring
“incompletely theorized agreements” over comprehensive or definitive judicial resolutions of
controversial political issues); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT (1999) (favoring narrow Supreme Court decisions that permit democratic
reflection by the elected branches); Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996); see also Robert P. George, Law, Democracy,
and Moral Disagreement, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1997) (book review) (favoring political over judicial
resolutions of morally charged political conflicts).
7. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999) (disfavoring judicial review); Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question in Constitutional Law, 81
MINN. L. REV. 1, 25-28 (1996) (disfavoring judicial review); cf. GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE
AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993)
(arguing that judicial review harms racial minorities).  But see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (favoring judicial
supremacy in constitutional interpretation that binds other branches of government).  Professor
Klarman has argued, as a positive matter, that judicial review often ends up entailing mere deference to
majoritarian political preferences.  See generally Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
381 (1997).
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affirmative action remained central to the pursuit of racial justice in the United
States.8  He also attempted to make civil rights a priority on the national agenda
by creating a blue ribbon Advisory Panel on Race, headed by historian John
Hope Franklin, that gave the President specific policy recommendations on
ways to promote racial reconciliation and to enhance equal opportunities for
racial minorities.9  Consistent with those actions, President Clinton has made
executive and judicial appointments that have provided an unprecedented level
of race and gender diversity in the federal government.10  Although the
President has sometimes sacrificed racial minority interests for what appear to
be politically opportunistic reasons,11 no one seems to question his personal
commitment to racial equality.12  President Clinton has supported affirmative
action both in theory and in practice, but he could have done more.
What President Clinton has failed to do is to assert the full scope of his
constitutional authority to formulate race relations policy for the nation that
elected him to be its political leader.  In so doing, he has aligned himself with
past Presidents who were passive rather than active in the formulation of
constitutional policy.  It is often convenient for a President to deflect political
controversy to the Supreme Court.  A President can appease political allies with
rhetoric that endorses more than the Court will allow, and can appease political
opponents by acquiescing in Court-ordered results that fall short of presidential
rhetoric.  That is rational behavior for a politician—particularly in the
contemporary environment of designer politics, where rhetorical labels seem to
matter at least as much substantive outcomes.  It is rational, but it may also be
unconstitutional.
III
  CLINTON’S CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION
The structure of the Constitution distinguishes between legal issues that are
appropriate for judicial resolution, and policy issues that are appropriate for
resolution by the democratically elected branches of government.  John
8. See CITIZENS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TEST OF OUR PROGRESS: THE CLINTON
RECORD ON CIVIL RIGHTS 5-11 (1999); Steven H. Holmes, Politics; On Civil Rights, Clinton Steers
Bumpy Course Between Right and Left, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at 16.
9. See CITIZENS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 7; Holmes, supra note 8, at 16.
10. See CITIZENS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 8, at 5; Holmes, supra note 8, at 16.
11. President Clinton withdrew his nomination of Lani Guinier to head the Civil Rights Division of
the Justice Department, and delayed filling other key civil rights posts, because of conservative political
opposition.  He also signed a controversial Welfare bill that would adversely affect the interests of the
minority poor.  In an attempt to create the impression that he was tough on crime during his first
presidential campaign, Clinton left New Hampshire before that state’s primary and returned to
Arkansas to preside over the execution of Ricky Ray Rector, a mentally impaired black man who was
convicted of killing a white police officer.  During the same campaign, Clinton gratuitously criticized
black rap artist Sister Souljah at Jesse Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition convention.  In general, minorities
fear that he is likely to behave in a manner that is more politically expedient than principled.  See
Holmes, supra note 8, at 16.
12. From his early childhood, President Clinton has been involved in, familiar with, and
comfortable with black culture.  See id.
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Marshall recognized the distinction in Marbury v. Madison13 when he disclaimed
judicial authority to resolve issues that were political in nature.14  Over time,
however, the distinction between constitutional law and ordinary politics has
eroded.  The Supreme Court has exercised unconstrained policymaking
discretion whenever it thought it could do a better job than the elected branches
of defusing political controversy.  Dred Scott,15 Lochner,16 Brown,17 Miranda,18
and Roe v. Wade19 are the most obvious examples of Supreme Court
policymaking, but the Supreme Court’s affirmative action cases also fall into
this category.  In routinely invalidating affirmative action programs, the Court
has chosen to substitute its aversion to affirmative action for the policy
preferences of the political bodies that adopted those programs.  Such judicial
activism offends the most fundamental structural safeguards of the
Constitution—just as it did in cases like Dred Scott and Lochner.  But so does
presidential acquiescence in such judicial activism.
When a President acquiesces in the Supreme Court’s usurpation of
policymaking discretion, that President fails to operate in a manner that is
consistent with constitutional separation of powers safeguards.  The
undemocratic, countermajoritarian difficulties inherent in Supreme Court
policymaking suggest that the Court should not read its policy preferences into
the Constitution, but if it does, the Court’s policy preferences should certainly
not be deemed dispositive.  They should merely be the starting point for further
political debate between the Court and the representative branches of
government.  Thomas Jefferson understood this when he emphasized that the
Constitution no more gave the Supreme Court the right to impose its version of
constitutional meaning on the President than it gave the President the right to
impose his version of constitutional meaning on the Court.  Each branch took
an oath to uphold the Constitution, and each had the final say over
constitutional interpretation within its own sphere of authority.20  Andrew Jack-
son adopted a comparable position when he vetoed legislation to recharter the
Bank of the United States because he disagreed with the Supreme Court’s
conclusion about the bank’s constitutionality.21  He added force to this position
when his political intimidation apparently dissuaded the Supreme Court from
13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).
14. See id. at 166 (finding that courts do not have power to examine the exercise of executive dis-
cretion regarding political issues).
15. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
16. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (“[T]he Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution.”).
20. See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 20-27 (13th ed.
1997); STONE ET AL., supra note 2, at 53-57.
21. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 21-22; STONE ET AL., supra note 2, at 53-57.
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recognizing Cherokee sovereignty out of fear that the Court’s ruling might be
politically defied.22
Abraham Lincoln conceded that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution in Dred Scott was binding on the parties before the Court, but he
argued that the Court’s decision could not be deemed binding on the
representative branches in other cases without denying the people their
constitutional power of representative self-governance.  The representative
branches had the political right to resist the Supreme Court’s constitutional
interpretations in the hope that the Court would reverse itself in subsequent
cases.23  In fact, this view seems to follow from the Supreme Court’s own
Marbury-based insistence that the scope of federal judicial power is confined by
the case or controversy provision of Article III to the resolution of particular
disputes, and does not extend to the issuance of prospective legislative-type
policy pronouncements.24
A modern incarnation of this view in a statutory context is the
nonacquiescence in lower court policymaking that was practiced by some
administrative agencies during the Reagan Administration.25 Franklin D.
Roosevelt enlarged upon Lincoln’s view in concluding that he would defy an
adverse Supreme Court decision in the Gold Clause Cases.26  He then went on to
make history by proposing his Court-packing plan, which successfully
neutralized Supreme Court political opposition to his New Deal legislation.27  In
Cooper v. Aaron,28 the Supreme Court declared itself to be the final expositor of
constitutional meaning,29 but that judicial declaration does not answer the
question of Supreme Court finality; it simply begs it.
Separation of powers requires a President to check and to balance Supreme
Court usurpations of political policymaking power.  It does not authorize a
President to abdicate policymaking responsibility to a politically unaccountable
Court.  Although President Clinton has forcefully asserted his support for race-
conscious affirmative action, he has declined to challenge the Court’s political
rejection of his views.  Instead, he has acquiesced in the Court’s conclusion that
colorblind, race neutrality is virtually always a constitutional requirement.30  If
22. See RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY 20-35 (1999);
GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 24; Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REV.
1971, 1979-80 n.24 (1990); see also Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500 (1969).
23. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 22; STONE ET AL., supra note 2, at 53-57.
24. See FALLON ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 67-92 (4th ed. 1996).
25. See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 414-16 (3d ed.
1998).
26. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 23; STONE ET AL., supra note 2, at 53-57.
27. See GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 183-85; STONE ET AL., supra note 2, at 215.
28. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
29. See id. at 17-20; see also GUNTHER & SULLIVAN, supra note 20, at 25-27; STONE ET AL., supra
note 2, at 53-54.
30. Notwithstanding Supreme Court dicta to the contrary, see Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (noting that strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal scrutiny), the strict equal
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President Clinton disagrees with that conclusion—as do the four Supreme
Court Justices who routinely dissent in the Court’s affirmative action cases31—
he should use the political means at his disposal to challenge the Supreme
Court’s rulings.  Like Presidents Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt, he
should actively resist the Court’s claim to finality in constitutional exposition,
and he should dispute the Court’s right to impose its own political preferences
on the rest of the nation.
IV
CLINTON’S CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT
There are at least three recent cases in which the President could have done
more than he did to reclaim political leadership from the Court.  In Adarand
Constructors v. Pena,32 the Supreme Court first applied strict scrutiny to a
benign federal affirmative action program.  The program granted favorable
treatment to socially and economically disadvantaged construction contractors,
but it also adopted a rebuttable presumption that women and racial minorities
were socially and economically disadvantaged.  The Court held that the racial
presumption was subject to strict scrutiny.33 On remand, the district court
invalidated the presumption on the ground that it was not narrowly tailored
enough to survive strict scrutiny.34  The President appealed, but argued that the
case had become moot when the white male plaintiff was ultimately granted the
status of a disadvantaged contractor.  Although the plaintiff argued that it had
been granted this status only because of the district court order invalidating the
race and gender presumption on remand, the Tenth Circuit held that the case
had become moot and vacated the district court order.35  It is not clear whether
the federal government was implicated in the actions that assertedly made the
case moot.36  However, the President could have taken a more forceful political
position by defending the affirmative action plan on its merits rather than
seeking a dismissal on the ground of mootness.37  The Adarand program
protection scrutiny now applied to racial affirmative action has always proven to be fatal since the
Court’s now-discredited decision in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  See STONE ET
AL., supra note 2, at 601.
31. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer typically dissent in Supreme Court decisions
that invalidate affirmative action programs.  See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 156-63
(2000) (discussing Supreme Court affirmative action voting blocs); Girardeau A. Spann, Affirmative
Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 18-21 (1995) (discussing Supreme Court affirmative action
voting blocs).
32. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
33. See id. at 205-10.
34. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1558-59, 1577-84 (D. Colo. 1997).
35. See Adarand Constructors v. Slater, 169 F.3d 1292, 1296-99 (10th Cir. 1999).
36. A state agency conferred a favorable status on the plaintiff, but the plaintiff argued that the
federal government’s involvement made the case analogous to cases in which the party seeking a
mootness declaration was itself the one who had caused the case to become moot.  See id. at 1298-99.
37. To the extent mootness is jurisdictional, the President could have argued that the voluntary
cessation exception to the mootness doctrine was triggered by the state-agency decision certifying the
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presented perhaps the strongest affirmative action case imaginable.  The
affirmative action program at issue consisted of only a rebuttable presumption
that women and racial minorities had been socially and economically
disadvantaged.  If such an obviously accurate presumption offends the
Constitution, the President should have forced the Supreme Court to say so,
and to retract its Adarand dicta promising that strict scrutiny is not necessarily
fatal scrutiny.38  The political process could then respond to such a Plessy-type
judicial pronouncement as it deemed appropriate.39
The second case in which the President could have done more to advance
his affirmative action agenda is Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson,40 a
case in which the lower courts split over the constitutionality of Proposition 209,
the 1996 California voter initiative that prohibited state agencies from engaging
in race or gender affirmative action.  The Clinton Administration challenged
the constitutionality of Proposition 209 as an amicus curiae in the Court of
Appeals,41 but declined to urge the Supreme Court to grant review of a Ninth
Circuit decision upholding the initiative against the claim that its purported
neutrality actually constituted racial discrimination.42  The Supreme Court
denied review and permitted Proposition 209 to take effect.43  This time
President Clinton passed up the opportunity to press the Court to decide
whether the Constitution allows facial neutrality to be used as a device to freeze
existing inequalities into law.  Again, if the Supreme Court thinks this to be the
case, the President should force the Court to say so, thereby permitting the
political process to fashion an appropriate response.
The third case in which the President could have taken more forceful
political action to advance his stated affirmative action goals is Taxman v.
Piscataway Township Board of Education.44  A Title VII case with equal
protection overtones, Taxman squarely presented the issue of whether a public
school affirmative action plan could take racial diversity into account when de-
ciding which of two teachers with equal qualifications and equal seniority had to
be laid off for budgetary reasons.45  The Taxman challenge to the Piscataway
plaintiff as disadvantaged.  See id; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 24, at 219-20 (discussing the
voluntary cessation exception).  The Supreme Court ultimately adopted this reasoning in reversing the
Tenth Circuit decision and remanding the case for further proceedings on the merits.  See Adarand
Constructors v. Slater, 120 S. Ct. 722 (2000).
38. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 (stating that strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal scrutiny).
39. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544-46 (1896), the Supreme Court adopted the obviously
fictitious position that racial segregation in 1896 Louisiana did not imply the inferiority of blacks.
40. 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997).
41. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 122 F.3d at 703 (stating the position of United States as amicus
curiae).
42. See Coalition for Econ. Equity, 522 U.S. 963 (1997) (granting leave to file amicus briefs to
petitioners not including the United States).
43. See id. (denying certiorari).
44. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d. Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 521 U.S. 1117, cert. dismissed, 522 U.S.
1010 (1997).
45. See Taxman, 91 F.3d. at 1551-52 (describing the facts of case). Where public employers are
involved, as in the Taxman case, the impermissible consideration of race could raise equal protection
issues independent of the Title VII issues that were before the Taxman court.
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affirmative action plan was originally filed by the Justice Department during the
Bush Administration.  However, while an appeal from a district court decision
invalidating the plan was pending in the Third Circuit, the Clinton Justice
Department withdrew from the case after the Third Circuit denied its request to
switch sides and support the affirmative action plan.  When the Third Circuit
affirmed the district court invalidation of the Piscataway plan, President Clinton
directed the Justice Department to switch sides again and ask the Supreme
Court not to grant review.  The Supreme Court granted review nevertheless,
and the Justice Department argued that the Piscataway affirmative action plan
should be invalidated because it did not fall within the narrow range of
circumstances in which race could be considered for non-remedial purposes.
Deprived of the Administration’s support, the school board settled the case at
the urging of civil rights groups who feared an adverse Supreme Court prece-
dent, and the Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot.46  President Clinton
was presumably trying to preserve some modicum of affirmative action from
invalidation by a blunderbuss Supreme Court affirmance, but his action is most
noteworthy for its willingness to let the Supreme Court dictate the terms of the
political debate about affirmative action.  Once again, the President passed up
an opportunity to litigate a very strong affirmative action case, this time raising
the issue of whether racial diversity can ever be considered in an educational
context.  If the Supreme Court thinks that the goal of racial diversity is
unconstitutional, then the President should force the Court to say so, thereby
permitting the political process to respond accordingly.
One might wonder—as the President and some civil rights organizations
apparently do—whether it is preferable to evade adverse Supreme Court
precedents in the hope of fighting another day before a more hospitable Court.
That, however, seems to concede the very separation of powers question at
issue.  My point is that the President and the political branches of the federal,
state, and local governments should be the ones making political policy—not
the Supreme Court.  If the Court is successfully able to chill the political
branches into self-censoring their own political preferences, the Court will
succeed in dominating the political policymaking process just as surely as when
it directly overrides majoritarian political preferences.  Indeed, the thrust of my
argument is that such presidential self-censorship in order to avoid a political
confrontation with the Supreme Court is a passive abdication of presidential
power.
I have argued that President Clinton could have challenged the Supreme
Court’s usurpation of affirmative action policymaking power by adopting a
more aggressive Supreme Court appeal policy, but there are even more forceful
political actions the President can take to reclaim political power from the
Court.  Once one ceases to view the Supreme Court as the final expositor of
constitutional meaning, Supreme Court decisions can be recognized as mere
46. The procedural history of Taxman is described in SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION, supra note 31, at 69-78.
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opening gambits  in an ongoing political negotiation between the Court and the
representative branches.  As a result, forceful political action that might seem
inappropriate in response to an apolitical Supreme Court adjudication
emanating from constitutional principle re-emerges as an appropriate political
check on Supreme Court political policymaking excesses.
For example, if the Supreme Court declares that the Constitution prohibits a
legislature from presuming that women and minorities are disadvantaged, or
that the Constitution prevents a school board from pursuing diversity in an
educational context, a President who favors affirmative action could denounce
those decisions in a manner designed to be politically efficacious.  The President
could object to the Court’s decisions not only as bad policy, but also as
illegitimate exercises of democratic policymaking power that the Supreme
Court does not possess under our constitutional scheme of governance.  He
could also announce that, consistent with the case or controversy requirement
of Article III, adverse Supreme Court affirmative action decisions will be
narrowly construed in situations where even slight variations in facts are
arguably material.  The fact that Adarand might invalidate an affirmative action
presumption for Latinos in Colorado does not therefore mean that Adarand
invalidates a similar presumption for blacks in Alabama or Asians in New York.
Different groups in different states might have different levels of disadvantage
or different histories of discrimination.  This policy of non-acquiescence would
give the Court many opportunities to reconsider the constitutional soundness of
its rulings in the varying factual contexts of the many subsequent cases with
which the Court will be presented.
The President could propose legislation to strip the Court of appellate
jurisdiction to invalidate affirmative action programs adopted by the political
branches, and could stress the need for such legislation to restore the proper
balance of power between the Court and the political branches of government.
The President could also initiate a national discussion of whether impeachment
is an appropriate remedy for Supreme Court Justices who persist in their efforts
to usurp policymaking power in defiance of the separation of powers safeguards
envisioned by the Framers.  If impeachment is an appropriate remedy for
presidential transgressions that are minor and personal in nature, it is an even
more appropriate remedy for judicial transgressions that are constitutional and
antidemocratic in nature.  In addition, the President could propose an affirma-
tive action amendment to the Constitution that would preclude future Courts
from invalidating affirmative action programs adopted by the democratically
accountable branches of government.  By taking such forceful actions to exert
political pressure on the Court, the President would be adding to the legacy of
those dynamic past Presidents who refused to permit their political agendas to
be undermined by the policy preferences of Supreme Court Justices who
happened to have different political tastes.  Presumably, the Supreme Court
would eventually conclude that its aversion to affirmative action was out of step
SPANN_FMT.DOC 11/14/00  10:56 AM
476 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 63: Nos. 1 & 2
with majoritarian views on affirmative action, and the Court would have the
wisdom to bring its current Lochner era to an end.47
V
  CONCLUSION
At this point one might well wonder whether President Clinton—or indeed
the American public—is sufficiently committed to the concept of racial
affirmative action to warrant the political confrontation with the Supreme
Court that I have advocated.  The American public does seem to be intensely
confused and profoundly ambivalent about affirmative action.  Polls indicate
that public support for affirmative action varies most strongly with how the
polling questions happen to be phrased.48 That is precisely why political
leadership is so important with respect to the affirmative action issue.  President
Clinton has stated that he favors affirmative action, and that racial recon-
ciliation is a high priority in his Administration.  Perhaps this is political
posturing, and perhaps his idea of racial reconciliation is the continued sacrifice
of minority rights for majoritarian gain.  But if we are to take the President at
his word when he states that mending affirmative action is an important item on
his political agenda, then we can justifiably expect him to take the lead in the
formulation of affirmative action policy.  We can justifiably urge the President
not to abdicate this leadership role to an unelected and unrepresentative
Supreme Court.  Throughout history, the Supreme Court has invoked the
Constitution to nullify gains that racial minorities have obtained through the
political process.49  The Court is doing the same thing today when it invalidates
47. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme Court began a 32-year period during
which it invalidated numerous health and safety statutes on the ground that they offended the notion of
laissez-faire capitalism—a doctrine that the Lochner Court “found” to be embodied in the Constitution.
The Lochner era came to an end when the Court eventually concluded that it was imprudent to
continue resisting popular political sentiment for health and safety legislation.  See generally STONE ET
AL., supra note 2, at 813-42.
48. See DeNeen L. Brown, Gray in the Debate on Color: Many See Both Sides of Affirmative
Action, WASH. POST, June 5, 1995, at A1 (surveying attitudes on affirmative action); Linda
Greenhouse, Justices, 5 to 4, Cast Doubts on U.S. Programs that Give Preferences Based Upon Race,
N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at A1 (reporting that affirmative action is the subject of vigorous debate in
Congress and states); John F. Harris, For Clinton, A Challenge of Balance, WASH. POST, June 14, 1995,
at A1 (describing popular ambivalence about affirmative action); Louis Harris, Affirmative Action and
the Voter, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1995, at A13 (stating that Republicans are exploiting confusion among
voters between affirmative action, which voters favor, and preferences, which voters do not favor);
Nicholas Lemann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1995, at 36, 39-43, 52-54
(MAGAZINE) (stating that Republicans are exploiting confusion among voters between affirmative
action, which voters favor, and preferences, which voters do not favor).
49. For example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), the Supreme Court
invalidated a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the forcible removal without judicial process of blacks
from the state for the purpose of detaining them as slaves, finding the statute to interfere with the
property rights of slave owners.  In Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), the Supreme
Court invalidated the Missouri Compromise prohibition on slavery in certain federal territories, also on
the ground that the Constitution protected the property rights of slave owners.  In the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Supreme Court invalidated the public accommodations provisions of the
Civil Rights Act of 1875, and imposed a state-action requirement on the 14th Amendment that made
southern states, rather than the federal government, the primary guarantors of civil rights.  See
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affirmative action programs that were adopted by the political branches of
government.  The Constitution does not authorize the Court to supplant
popular politics with Supreme Court politics.  Rather, it authorizes the
President to ensure that the Court remains within the adjudicatory realm by
giving the President the political power to check judicial incursions into the
policymaking realm.  When the President declines to exercise this political
power to protect affirmative action, one not only wonders whether the
President is writing off race, but one also begins to wonder whether he is writing
off our constitutional form of government as well.
generally STONE ET AL., supra note 2, at 501-12.
